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Abstract 
Patient safety research has adapted concepts and methods from the workplace safety literature 
(safety climate, incident reporting) to explain why patients experience unintentional harm during 
clinical treatment in hospital (adverse events). Consequently, patient safety has primarily been 
studied through data generated by healthcare staff. However, because adverse events relate to 
patient injuries, it is suggested that patients and their families may also have valuable insights for 
investigating patient safety in hospitals. We conceptualized this idea by proposing that patients are 
stakeholders in hospital safety who, through their experiences of treatments and independence 
from institutional culture, can provide valid and supplementary data on unsafe clinical care. In 59 
UK hospitals we investigated whether patient evaluations of care (n = 23,287 surveys) and the 
safety information contained in healthcare complaints (n = 2,017, containing 2.5 million words) 
explained variance in excess patient deaths (hospital mortality) beyond staff evaluations of care (n 
= 49,302 surveys) and incident reports (n = 242,859). The severity of reports on unsafe clinical 
behaviors (error and neglect) communicated in patient’ healthcare complaints explained additional 
variance in hospital-level mortality rates beyond that of staff-generated data. The results indicate 
that patients provide valid and supplementary data on unsafe care in hospitals. Generalized to 
other organizational domains, the findings suggest that non-employee stakeholders should be 
included in assessments of safety performance if they experience or observe unsafe behaviors. 
Theoretically, it is necessary to further examine how concepts such as safety climate can 
incorporate the observations and outcomes of stakeholders in safety. 
Key words: Safety performance, complaints, patient safety, incident reports, safety climate 
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Approximately 10% of patients experience an adverse event (unintended harm during 
treatment) in hospital, with half of such events being preventable and 14% resulting in disability 
or death (de Vries, Ramrattan, Smorenburg, Gouma, & Boermeester, 2008). To improve patient 
safety and understand why adverse events occur, researchers have adapted concepts (e.g., safety 
climate) and methods (e.g., employee surveys, incident reporting) used by applied psychologists 
to explain and reduce workplace accidents (Flin, 2007; Vincent, 2011). As a consequence, patient 
safety in hospitals has primarily been studied through the collection and analysis of data generated 
by healthcare staff. However, because the target of patient safety is patient rather than employee 
outcomes, patients and their families (hereinafter ‘patients’) may also have valuable insight on the 
safety of care (Davis, Sevdalis, Neale, Massey, & Vincent, 2013; Papanicolas & Figueroa, 2019). 
The idea that patients can provide information to explain and monitor patient safety in hospitals is 
significant because, to date, applied psychological research on safety in organizations has mostly 
used employee-data to build theory and study accidents, and it suggests that non-employees may 
also be able to provide safety data. To develop and establish this idea, we investigate the validity 
and added value of using patient-generated data (collected through patient surveys and healthcare 
complaints) to investigate the safety of hospital care.  
Safety in Organizations 
Patient safety is one of several research domains (e.g., workplace safety, process safety) in 
which psychologists explore the causes of accidents and physical harm in organizations (Beus, 
McCord, & Zohar, 2016; Hopkins, 2009). The application of psychological constructs (e.g., safety 
climate) to explain safety outcomes in different domains is argued as beneficial, because the 
cross-fertilization of ideas, methods, and results between distinct fields of inquiry facilities a 
holistic “understanding of how to manage the full range of safety issues in organizations” 
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(Hofmann, Burke, & Zohar, 2017, p. 384). Building on the idea that integrating safety research 
from different domains can lead to both a more holistic analysis of safety outcomes in 
organizations and new research questions, we compare and integrate the literature on patient 
safety and workplace safety (see Figure 1). This provides the theoretical basis for investigating 
patient safety through patient-generated data, and reveals that external (i.e., non-employee) reports 
on safety behaviors in organizations may be useful in domains beyond patient safety.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Workplace Safety and Patient Safety: Similarities 
Research on employee and patient safety assumes shared determinants. For both, safety 
climate and leadership demonstrate the organizational prioritization of safety, which in turn 
predicts employee safety performance (i.e., safety compliance and participation for avoiding 
worker injury, and error-free and high-quality care for avoiding patient harm) and occupational or 
medical accidents (Agnew, Flin, & Mearns, 2013; Beus et al., 2016; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, 
& Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2013; Flin, 2007; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Katz-Navon, 
Naveh, & Stern, 2005; Singer, Lin, Falwell, Gaba, & Baker, 2009). The knowledge, skills, and 
motivations of staff to behave safely mediate the link between safety climate and unsafe acts, with 
contextual factors (e.g., policies) also being key antecedents (Flin, 2007; Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Leroy et al., 2012; Wakefield, McLaws, Whitby, & Patton, 2010; Weaver et al., 2013).  
In terms of measurement and empirical findings, the workplace safety and patient safety 
literatures are also analogous. Safety climate is measured through employee surveys, and both 
employee harm (e.g., nursing injuries) and patient harm are predicted by similar constructs (e.g., 
employee perceptions of management commitment to safety) and instruments (Hofmann & Mark, 
2006; Taylor et al., 2012). Furthermore, to investigate safety behaviors and safety incidents, 
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researchers in both fields collect incident and safety reports from employees, co-workers, and 
supervisors; due to their expertise, institutional roles, and proximity to safety management, these 
organizational members can provide insight into unsafe behaviors, the reasons why such 
behaviors occur, and their consequences (Agnew et al., 2013; Christian et al., 2009; Katz-Navon, 
Naveh, & Stern, 2009; Vincent, 2011; Xia, Griffin, Wang, Liu, & Wang, 2018).  
Workplace Safety and Patient Safety: Differences  
Although initially similar, the different foci of the workplace safety and patient safety 
literatures (employees and patients) has led to divergences in conceptualization and measurement. 
The focus of safety climate in patient safety research is the prioritization of safe care delivery to 
patients rather than the avoidance of employee workplace accidents (Flin, 2007; Halligan & 
Zecevic, 2011; Olsen, 2010). Furthermore, while safe patient care is also determined by the 
knowledge, skills, and motivations of employees, these factors tend to relate to clinical practices 
(Singer et al., 2009; Vincent, 2011; Vogus, Sutcliffe, & Weick, 2010), with the behaviors crucial 
for avoiding patient harm differing from the safety compliance and safety participation behaviors 
important for avoiding workplace accidents (Griffin & Neal, 2000). Specifically, because patient 
safety is integral to taskwork (Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994) in clinical care and is not a 
parallel activity (e.g., following safety rules while operating machinery), researchers have focused 
on erroneous or neglectful behaviors in healthcare delivery that are proximal (e.g., misdiagnosis 
leading to death) or distal (e.g., ignoring hygiene rules, which leads to infection) causes of harm 
(Dixon-Woods, Suokas, Pitchforth, & Tarrant, 2009; Reader & Gillespie, 2013; Vincent, 2011). 
A further key difference is that research on workplace safety explains occupational harm 
through data (e.g., safety climate, incidents, behaviors) provided by those who potentially cause 
and/or experience accidents (i.e., employees). By contrast, adverse events are understood through 
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data provided by the staff who strive to provide safe care, and the experiences of those (i.e., 
patients) who experience harm have mostly been neglected (Harrison et al., 2015; Sahlström, 
Partanen, & Turunen, 2018). This neglect is due to data validity concerns, minimal theorization of 
the value of patient data, and the absence of a parallel research stream in the workplace safety 
literature. However, in the context of limited success in reducing adverse event rates, patient 
reports on unsafe care may provide supplementary insight into why unintended patient harm 
occurs and how it can be avoided (O’Hara et al., 2018; Shojania & Thomas, 2013; Wachter, 2010; 
Walton et al., 2017). A growing literature on patient experiences of hospital safety (e.g., using 
incident reports, surveys, complaints) has emerged and indicates that patients can reveal distinct 
safety problems (Levtzion-Korach et al., 2010), for instance, errors or neglectful acts unseen or 
unreported by staff (e.g., diagnosis errors, continuity issues, not cleaning wounds) (Armitage et 
al., 2018; Davis et al., 2013; Gillespie & Reader, 2018; Walton et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the 
value of patient-generated safety data is unconceptualized, untested, and not examined in terms of 
significance for patient safety or the wider safety literature.  
Patients as Stakeholders in Safety 
To conceptualize and investigate the role of patients in patient safety, the organizational 
stakeholder literature is instructive. Because patients are participants (Ocloo & Matthews, 2016) 
rather than formal members of healthcare organizations (i.e., they are service users, often without 
clinical training, or contracted behavioral obligations), they can be considered organizational 
stakeholders: “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). According to this literature, stakeholders can 
have important information for optimizing and legitimizing managerial decision-making due to 
their alternative experiences and independent insight into an institution’s performance (Beierle, 
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2002; Fang, Palmatier, & Evans, 2008; Smith & Ingram, 2002). This observation is significant for 
patient safety, as it suggests that patients might be conceptualized as “stakeholders in safety,” 
whose experience and stake in the provision and consequences of healthcare delivery can provide 
distinct and useful information on the unsafe behaviors that lead to unintended patient harm.  
Concretely, patient stakeholder observations on safety are valuable for two reasons. First, 
due to their alternative perspective on clinical treatments (i.e., as recipients), patients may observe 
and report different safety problems to healthcare employees. Supporting this assertion, research 
has shown that while clinicians tend to report on unambiguous medical errors, patients report on 
everyday behaviors that are important for safety, yet challenging to monitor reliably: for instance, 
mistakes in note-taking, neglectful care, ignoring patient information, medication errors, or 
ignoring alarms (Davis et al., 2013; O’Hara et al., 2018; Rathert, Brandt, & Williams, 2012; 
Walton et al., 2017). Second, patients are independent of the cultural factors that inhibit clinician 
safety reporting, for instance, reluctance to admit mistakes, fear of retribution, or lack of 
institutional learning (Pfeiffer, Manser, & Wehner, 2010; Waring, 2005). Investigations of major 
hospital failures (Francis, 2013) have found that healthcare complaints from patients reporting 
unsafe behavior (and not employee reporting) provide early signs of systemic failings in safety.   
Thus, by conceptualizing patients as stakeholders in safety, the validity and importance of 
using patient reports about unsafe hospital care can be explained. This theorization arises from the 
adaptation of concepts and methods from the workplace safety literature to explain and measure 
patient safety, and the emergent incongruities. In a complementary fashion, the idea that patient-
generated data can be used to study safety in healthcare institutions has implications for 
workplace safety research. For instance, research has shown that low safety climate and the poor 
or inconsistent implementation of safety systems negatively impacts employee incident reporting 
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(Probst, Brubaker, & Barsotti, 2008; Reason, 2000; Zohar, 2010). This has necessitated the use of 
different data sources and perspectives (e.g., co-workers) to collect information on safety 
behaviors (Beus et al., 2016; Griffin & Hu, 2013; Xia et al., 2018). Demonstrating that patients 
provide valid and useful data on patient safety could yield a new source of data – external 
stakeholders – for studying safety in settings where unsafe employee behaviors are consequential 
for both non-employees and employees (e.g., public transport, food standards, building safety).  
Current Study 
To investigate the validity and added value of patient-generated information on patient 
safety in healthcare institutions, we analyzed data pertaining to unsafe care contained within 
patient experience surveys and healthcare complaints. We investigated the relationship of these 
data with the Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) in UK National Health Service 
(NHS) hospitals. SHMI is considered a proxy measure of patient safety (Bottle, Jarman, & Aylin, 
2011) due to it capturing excess deaths potentially caused by neglectful care and medical errors.  
Patient experience surveys are administered annually in the NHS, and are used to generate 
patient-centered evaluations of hospital care (hereinafter patient evaluations of care), with reports 
of problems in healthcare delivery (e.g., treatment delays, poor responsiveness, feeding problems) 
that can lead to unsafe outcomes (e.g., due to patients not receiving timely treatment, suffering 
malnutrition) being solicited (Flott, Graham, Darzi, & Mayer, 2017; Raleigh, Frosini, Sizmur, & 
Graham, 2012). Due to capturing data on unsafe clinical behaviors, patient evaluations of care are 
theorized as a potential indicator of patient safety in hospitals (Doyle, Lennox, & Bell, 2013), and 
thus might be expected to be associated with SHMI. 
Healthcare complaints are unsolicited reports from patients on, among a range of issues, 
unsafe care (Reader, Gillespie, & Roberts, 2014). Three different analyses are suggested for 
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leveraging the safety data in complaints. First, the number of complaints per admissions unit 
received by hospitals (hereinafter complaint frequency) is a possible safety indicator, as high 
complaint frequency may indicate safety problems (Taylor, Wolfe, & Cameron, 2004; The NHS 
Information Centre, 2014). Second, drawing on data science methods, unsafe care may be 
revealed through automated sentiment analyses of the complaint text (hereinafter complaint 
sentiment), with negative phrasing reflecting dissatisfaction due to unsafe care (Alemi, Torii, 
Clementz, & Aron, 2012; Greaves et al., 2014). Finally, complaints are shown to report clinical 
problems (hereinafter complaint clinical severity) pertaining to unsafe behaviors (error and 
neglect) observed during treatments (e.g., misdiagnoses, medication errors, ignoring hygiene 
rules); the average severity of these (e.g., minor mistakes in pain relief versus administering 
wrong cancer drugs) is a suggested indicator of patient safety (Gillespie & Reader, 2018).  
To summarize, we examine the validity of data pertaining to unsafe healthcare delivery 
contained within patient experience surveys and healthcare complaints, and ask:  
RQ1: Are patient-generated data on unsafe hospital care, captured through patient 
evaluations of care and healthcare complaints, associated with hospital-level mortality? 
We theorize that the value of patient-generated data on patient safety in hospitals lies in its 
potential to provide additional information to employee-generated data. We investigate this for 
two variables. First, staff evaluations of the standard of care provided in their hospital (hereinafter 
staff evaluations of care). This is measured through the NHS staff survey (which is distributed 
annually to a million employees), and is used as a measure of patient safety in hospitals (Powell, 
Dawson, Topakas, Durose, & Fewtrell, 2014). Second, employee-generated incident reports 
captured by the NHS National Reporting and Learning System. These data are used to monitor 
adverse events and near-misses in the NHS (Howell et al., 2015), with the number of incidents 
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reported, especially for severe events, being theorized to reveal the population of safety events 
and thus indicate the safety of hospital care (Stavropoulou, Doherty, & Tosey, 2015).  
In sum, to examine the added value of patient evaluations of care and healthcare 
complaints in relation to staff evaluations of care and incident reports, we ask:  
RQ2: Do patient-generated data on unsafe hospital care, captured through patient 
evaluations of care and healthcare complaints, explain additional variance in hospital-level 
mortality beyond that of staff evaluations of care and incident reports?  
Methods 
Healthcare complaints were the primary data. We requested 50 irreversibly anonymized 
typed complaints (the first 25 received after 04/01/2013 and 10/01/2013) from 137 independently 
managed acute hospitals (“trusts”). The dates counteracted seasonal effects. Fifty-nine trusts 
provided 2,017 machine-readable complaints (M = 34.19, SD = 12.25, range: 20–63), containing 
2,571,198 words (M = 1,274.76), which represented 14% of complaints received. The complaints 
received varied by trust due to variable resources for redaction (Appendix 1). All complaints were 
entered into NVivo11. Secondary data on patient experience, complaint frequency, staff surveys, 
incident-reports, SHMI, and provider spells were collected. The study was reviewed and approved 
by the institutional review board (ethics committee) at the London School of Economics.  
Measurements 
We used the following variables to test the research questions. Further description and 
information on them can be found in Table 1, Appendix 1, and Supplementary File 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Patient evaluations of care. We used the 2013 NHS in-patient survey to measure patient 
care evaluations. Adhering to its dimensional structure (Dawson, 2018), we analyzed responses to 
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25 items (0–10 scale). There were 23,287 responses (Hospital M = 394.69). Principal component 
analysis (PCA) indicated a single-factor solution (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92). ICC(1) was 
significant (p <  0.001) and low, with a small effect size (0.014, 95% CI [0.009-0.022]). ICC(2) 
was significant (p < 0.001) and high, with a large effect size (0.785, 95% CI [0.709-0.853]).  
Complaint frequency. This represents the number of complaints received by hospital per 
1,000 provider spells (admissions to hospital: see control variable). Data were from NHS digital. 
Complaint sentiment. The average sentiment for each complaint was computed in R with 
a widely used sentiment dictionary (Nielsen, 2011) consisting of 3,382 terms scored for sentiment 
from -5 (negative: e.g., “catastrophic”) to +5 (positive: e.g., “thrilled”). For every hospital, we 
scored all words and used the mean sentiment of words in each complaint to calculate sentiment.  
 Complaint clinical severity. This was specified through the Healthcare Complaints 
Analysis Tool (HCAT), a psychometrically reliable and theoretically informed coding framework 
grounded in the typology and severity of problems reported in complaints (Gillespie & Reader, 
2016). HCAT has been widely used to investigate complaints on unsafe care (e.g., Mack et al., 
2017; Trbovich & Vincent, 2019; Wallace et al., 2018). Complaints are codified by the clinical 
problems (error and neglect) or non-clinical problems reported (management and relationships 
issues). Two trained MSc psychology graduates coded all problems reported in all complaints, 
with interrater reliability tested by a random sample of 101 letters (5%). Coders identified the 
presence of 13 clinical problems (e.g., misdiagnosis, poor hygiene) or non-clinical problems (e.g., 
car parking). Multiple problems could be coded per complaint. Clinical problems were graded for 
severity: low (1), medium (2), or high (3). See Table 3 in the results for the full list of clinical 
problem types. Non-clinical problems were coded as having “0” clinical severity. Clinical severity 
was calculated for each hospital using the mean severity score for all problems reported.  
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Staff evaluations of care. Drawing on the NHS staff survey (NHS England, 2013), we 
analyzed responses (n = 49,302, Hospital M = 853.63) to four items measuring staff evaluations of 
their hospital. PCA indicated a single-factor solution (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.88). ICC(1) was 
significant (p <  0.001) and low, with a small effect size (0.053, 95% CI [0.038-0.078]). ICC(2) 
was significant (p < 0.001) and high, with a large effect size (0.939, 95% CI [0.916-0.959]).  
Incident reports. Using the NHS National Reporting and Learning Service, we calculated 
“all safety incidents” (e.g., medication error) and “severe safety incidents” (e.g., deaths) reported 
by staff per 1,000 bed days for each trust. In total, there were 242,859 (Mdn = 3,673) safety 
incidents and 1,171 (Mdn = 15) severe safety incidents reported.  
Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI). This is the published ratio of 
observed patient deaths to expected deaths (i.e., controlling for underlying risks) at each trust.  
Provider spells. To control for the size of each trust (i.e., patients treated), we controlled 
for “provider spells,” which refers to the number of continuous patient stays using a hospital bed.  
Analysis 
We generated descriptive data and determined normality for all the study variables, and 
calculated intraclass correlations to test the reliability of the coding for complaint problem 
severity. We used a two-step model to test the study’s research questions. First, to explore the 
associations among all study variables and examine the relationship between patient evaluations 
of care, healthcare complaints, and SHMI (RQ1), we used Spearman’s rank correlations (because 
some variables were not normally distributed). Second, to test whether patient-generated data on 
unsafe care explained variance in SHMI beyond staff-generated data (RQ2), we used a stepwise 
multiple regression with provider spells as a control variable. We first added the staff-generated 
measures to the model, followed by the patient-generated measures. Because the analysis aimed to 
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predict SHMI (a hospital-level outcome), the secondary data were at hospital level (i.e., safety 
incidents), and our hypothesis referred to hospital-level complaint profiles (frequency, sentiment, 
clinical severity), linear regression was deemed more appropriate than multilevel model analysis.  
Results 
Table 2 reports the descriptive data for the study variables. The average hospital score was 
7.18 for patient evaluations of care. On average, 3.96 complaints were submitted per 1,000 spells. 
The average sentiment of the text was −0.32 (range: −0.66 to 0.09). Shapiro–Wilk tests identified 
non-normal distributions for provider spells, all safety incidents, and severe safety incidents.  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 In total, 1,715 clinical problems and 2,658 non-clinical problems were reported in the 
complaints. Qualitative examples (by severity) are reported in Table 3 (see Supplementary File 2 
for all clinical problems). Interrater reliability analysis was performed by two coders on 101 
complaints, with an average ICC of 0.766 (95% CI [0.67–0.836], F(100, 95.3) = 7.73, p < 0.001). 
On average, there were 2.16 problems contained in each complaint (n = 2,017), and 535 reported 
high-severity clinical problems. The proportion of problems relating to high-severity clinical 
issues ranged from 0% to 27% in the hospitals sampled, with a mean score of 0.84 (range: 0–3).  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
RQ1: Are patient-generated data on unsafe hospital care, captured through patient evaluations of 
care and healthcare complaints, associated with hospital-level mortality?  
We used Spearman’s rank correlation to investigate the first research question (Figure 2). 
A nonparametric test was required because four of the study variables were not normally 
distributed. No associations with SHMI were found for patient spells (rs = −0.087, p = 0.513), 
patient evaluations of care (rs = −0.01, p = 0.938), complaint frequency (rs = 0.077, p = 0.563), or 
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complaint sentiment (rs = −0.123, p = 0.353). Clinical severity was significantly associated with 
higher SHMI rates (rs = 0.268, p = 0.04). Qualified support was found for RQ1, with the clinical 
severity of problems reported in healthcare complaints being associated with hospital mortality.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
RQ2: Do patient-generated data on unsafe hospital care, captured through patient 
evaluations of care and healthcare complaints, explain additional variance in hospital-level 
mortality beyond that of staff evaluations of care and incident reports?  
This question was investigated through a stepwise multiple regression (Table 4) with 
SHMI as the dependent variable and provider spells as a control (model 1). Model 2 tested the 
staff-generated data (staff evaluations of care, all safety incidents, and severe safety incidents). 
Model 3 tested the patient-generated data (patient evaluations of care, complaint frequency, 
complaint sentiment, and clinical severity). Table 4 reports the three regressions.  
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Model 1 found that a linear regression model with just provider spells was not significant 
(r2 < 0.001, F(1, 57) = 1.019, p = 0.317). Model 2 found that adding staff evaluations of care and 
staff-reported incident data to Model 1 created a non-significant regression equation (r2 = 0.031, 
F(4, 54) = 1.462, p = 0.227), although staff evaluations of care were negatively associated with 
SHMI (p < 0.05). Model 2 was not a significant improvement over Model 1 (r2 change = 0.03, p = 
0.20). Model 3 found that adding patient-generated data (patient evaluations of care, complaint 
frequency, complaint sentiment, and complaint clinical severity) to Model 2 led to a significant 
regression (r2 = 0.178, F(8, 50) = 2.566, p = 0.020) and improvement over Model 1 (r2 change = 
0.147, p = 0.015). Higher complaint clinical severity (p < 0.01) and poor staff evaluations of care 
(p < 0.01) were associated with higher SHMI. Model 3 was broadly consistent with the 
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assumptions for multiple regressions; although there was weak evidence of a non-linear 
relationship, there was no evidence of heteroscedasticity, the residuals were normally distributed, 
and there were no cases outside of Cook’s distance. Therefore, there was support for RQ2, with 
the severity of clinical problems reported in healthcare complaints explaining the variance in 
SHMI beyond staff-generated data.  
Discussion 
Our results indicate that patients – as stakeholders in safety – possess valid and 
supplementary information for monitoring and explaining unsafe care in hospitals. However, the 
validity of insight they provide depends on the data source and the analytical frame being used.  
Although patient evaluations of care through surveys have been suggested as a potential 
source of data on the safety of hospital care (Flott et al., 2017), poor experiences were not 
associated with lower SHMI. This may be because patient evaluations of care provide insight on 
average experiences pertaining to a range of care quality issues. Crucially, because the questions 
in the patient survey do not explicitly capture unsafe behaviors (e.g., medical errors) they may not 
capture the safety events that predict excess death rates. To better enable patients to engage as 
stakeholders in safety, patient survey items focusing on unsafe events should be developed.  
Furthermore, despite being used to indicate the safety of hospital care (The NHS 
Information Centre, 2014), fewer complaints were not associated with lower SHMI. This may 
reflect the lack of safety-specific information provided through analyzing complaint frequency, 
with fewer complaints potentially reflecting (a) patient normalization of unsafe care, (b) beliefs 
that complaints will not lead to change, (c) institutional barriers to complaining (i.e., discouraging 
people), or (d) defensive processes for recategorizing low-level complaints as informal issues.  
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Complaint sentiment was also not associated with SHMI. Although sentiment is reliable to 
measure and is widely used (Alemi et al., 2012), it may be overly blunt for detecting safety issues. 
Words indicating clinical problems (e.g., death) may be lost amidst words and negative sentiment 
on non-safety issues. Machine learning trained against human-coded or safety outcome data may 
be a more promising route to automation (Bleaney, Kuzyk, Man, Mayanloo, & Tizhoosh, 2018).  
Complaint clinical severity was associated with SHMI, indicating that useful insights into 
hospital safety can be generated when patient complaints are analyzed to yield specific data on 
unsafe behavior. The association with SHMI can be explained in two ways. First, and most 
simply, patient reports on clinical problems within healthcare complaints capture an accurate 
sample of the unsafe clinical behaviors that lead to patient harm and thus are associated with 
excess death rates. Second, and more subtly, healthcare complaints reveal the safety culture of a 
hospital. Many complaints contain information on severe safety problems; patients report on these 
through complaints as a last resort to obtain an institutional response. The fact that patients need 
to write a complaint about severe clinical issues indicates that unsafe clinical events are not being 
satisfactorily captured, resolved, or learned from. Accordingly, severe clinical complaints may 
reveal a poor safety culture, which is assumed to explain patient safety (Vogus et al., 2010).  
In terms of employee-generated data, staff evaluations of care were associated with SHMI, 
whereas incident reports were not. This is constant with research showing safety climate to predict 
patient safety incidents (Singer et al., 2009), and reflects the observation that incident reports may 
reveal institutional norms for reporting and safety climate rather than accident rates (Probst, 2015; 
Probst & Estrada, 2010). The finding that patient reports of behavior in healthcare complaints 
explain variance in SHMI beyond surveys of staff evaluations of care indicates the value of 
combining data from patients and staff to evaluate the safety of hospital care.   
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Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Demonstrating that patients can provide valid and supplementary information on unsafe 
hospital care through healthcare complaints has significance for patient safety research. Consistent 
with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), it indicates that patients are stakeholders in safety 
within hospitals. Due to their experiences of unsafe events and independence from cultural factors 
that shape reporting, patients provide valid and detailed information on unsafe behaviors that may 
be unseen or unreported by clinical staff. In particular, the gravity of problems raised by patients 
in healthcare complaints (e.g., incorrect surgery) demands that complaints are treated with respect, 
and used to understand why patient harm occurs and ensure organizational learning.  
Furthermore, drawing from the idea that research in different settings can lead to a more 
holistic understanding of safety in organizations (Hofmann et al., 2017), our findings have wider 
implications. While the behaviors for ensuring patient safety and workplace safety are distinct, 
demonstrating that patients can observe employee safety behaviors raises the question of whether 
stakeholders in other domains can provide similar insight; for example, in settings where 
stakeholders and employees are intertwined, such as public transport (e.g., where bus driver and 
passenger safety relies upon safe driving), policing (e.g., where officer and public safety hinge 
upon the safe use of force), or building maintenance (e.g., where compliance with health and 
safety rules impacts customers and staff). In light of the long-standing observation that incident 
reporting is a weak yet potentially powerful signal of safety problems (Macrae, 2009), and that 
safety climate and the enactment (rather than presence) of policies for capturing safety events 
determine incident reporting (Probst & Estrada, 2010; Zohar, 2010), stakeholders may represent a 
new and valuable channel for capturing information on both employee and stakeholder safety. 
Thus, for settings where stakeholders experience or observe unsafe behaviors, a more holistic 
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approach to investigating safety in organizations may be to integrate employee behaviors 
pertaining to different safety outcomes, and include stakeholder data in assessments of safety. 
Theoretically, concepts such as safety climate may be developed to provide an over-arching 
explanation of the safety-related reports and outcomes for both employees and stakeholders.  
By analyzing the unstructured textual data from patients to investigate employee safety 
behaviors, we have also demonstrated the potential of using large-scale textual data to study safety 
and supplement established measurements. This approach reflects the growing field of research 
using unstructured text (e.g., customer/patient reviews) to predict healthcare audits (Griffiths & 
Leaver, 2018), patient re-admissions (Glover et al., 2015), and faulty products (Bleaney et al., 
2018; Pierce et al., 2017). Advances in digitization and data accessibility mean that the range of 
domains where textual data and stakeholder perspectives can be used to investigate safety will 
likely increase, for instance, in analyzing complaint or social media data to identify reports of 
unsafe behavior (e.g., in public services) or gathering insight into safety culture by investigating 
employee online reviews of their company (e.g., references to safety in high-risk industries). 
However, to harness these data, our findings indicate that specific (e.g., for detecting unsafe 
behaviors) rather than generic (e.g., sentiment, satisfaction) measures should be fashioned. 
Limitations 
 Even though we did not control for population attributes or trust specialties, our outcome 
variable, SHMI, was weighted to take these aspects into account. SHMI, however, has been 
critiqued (Manaseki-Holland et al., 2019) over accuracy concerns (e.g., on record keeping, 
obscuration by expected deaths). Our reliance on secondary data has limitations. Due to 
resourcing constraints, the number of complaints redacted and received by each hospital varied, 
and there may have been variation in how hospitals gathered data (e.g., incident reports). We did 
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not construct the patient or staff survey items. While these both measured evaluations of the 
effectiveness of treatment delivery within a hospital, for which safety is integral, they did not 
directly map onto key constructs within the safety literature (e.g., safety climate).  
Our analysis of complaint clinical severity was based on human coding, and although we 
found good coding reliability, there is scope for improvement. Future research should investigate 
using manually coded complaints to train a supervised machine learning model to detect and 
grade complaints pointing to clinical problems. Furthermore, although patients reported on the 
causes of clinical problems (e.g., mistakes, training), staff perspectives (e.g., on resourcing) are 
required to fully explain why unsafe care occurred. Finally, the sample of patient experiences that 
end up in formal complaints is both a strength and a limitation of complaint data. Only a subset of 
patients make complaints (Gillespie & Reader, 2018), and although these capture unsafe events, 
they cannot be used to generalize patient experience (patient surveys are more suited for this).  
Conclusion 
By conceptualizing patients as independent and informed stakeholders in safety, and 
investigating their reports of unsafe clinical behavior, we explained variance in hospital-level 
mortality rates beyond that of staff evaluations of care and incident reports. This supports the idea 
that, in addition to employee-generated data, patient-generated data may be used to monitor and 
understand unsafe care in hospitals. More broadly, it indicates that non-employee stakeholders 
may provide an alternative and independent source of data on safety in contexts where they 
observe and/or experience unsafe employee behaviors. Accordingly, we propose that a more 
holistic analysis of safety in organizations will be achieved through integrating behaviors 
pertaining to different safety outcomes, explaining them using safety climate, and studying them 
through both employee and stakeholder generated-data. 
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Figure 1. Model summarizing key similarities and differences between the employee safety and 
patient safety literatures 
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Table 1. Study Variables 
Variable*: Measure Indicative of: 
Patient evaluations 
of care 
Psychometrically validated annual survey, running since 2002, with 
25 items measuring experiences of care for patients staying at least 
one night in hospital (Dawson, 2018). Items focused on: response 
times; staffing levels; waiting times; decision-making; help to eat; 
confidence in clinical staff. Scores were averaged for each hospital.  
Lapses in the quality of treatment delivery by clinical staff that 
potentially lead to unsafe outcomes. The survey does not measure 
safety directly (e.g., errors) and relates to patient-specific 
experiences (i.e., not the hospital as a whole).  
Complaint 
frequency 
The number of written complaints per 1,000 admissions (patients 
who stay overnight) was calculated for each hospital trust.  
High number of patients reporting problems with clinical safety. 
Can be shaped by other factors (e.g., barriers to complaining) and 
other issues (e.g., billing), and gives no insight on safety behavior.  
Complaint 
sentiment 
The average negativity of complaint text sent to each hospital trust. Dissatisfaction due to unsafe care. Sentiment may also reflect upset 
with non-clinical issues, and provides no behavioral data.   
Complaint clinical 
severity 
The average severity of clinical problems (graded on a 1–3 scale, 
with non-clinical problems being graded 0) reported in the 
complaints sent to each hospital trust. Clinical problems consisted of 
perceived errors or neglectful care: see Table 3 for examples.    
Unsafe behaviors in providing clinical care. Patients describe 
medical errors (e.g., for treatments, diagnoses) and neglectful care 
(e.g., for examinations, personal care) that lead to harm. Problems 
may not be accurately reported or may be misattributed (e.g., 
clinician medication error caused by equipment failure).   
All safety incidents The frequency of staff-reported safety incidents (potential or actual 
instances of patient harm) reported by staff per 1,000 bed days for 
Staff-reported events that endanger patient safety. Reporting trends 
influenced by safety climate (which encourages reporting and 
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Variable*: Measure Indicative of: 
each hospital trust. Incidents focused on problems such as 
diagnostic, procedural, equipment, or medication errors.  
learning), meaning that incident data provide a mixed indicator of 
safety (few reports can reveal poor safety climate or few incidents). 
Severe safety 
incidents 
The frequency of staff-reported severe safety incidents (e.g., wrong-
site surgery) reported by staff per 1,000 bed days for each hospital 
trust. 
Staff-reported events that led to patient death or disability. Due to 
the relatively low rates of such events, they are not optimal for 
revealing widespread problems in clinical delivery and may not be 
effectively reported in a highly unsafe hospital.   
Staff evaluations of 
care 
Annual employee survey, running since 2003 (The King's Fund, 
2017), with four items on effectiveness of care provided to patients 
(e.g., hospital prioritization of care; satisfaction with care standards). 
The average overall score for each hospital trust was used.   
Organizational conditions for providing safe care. Does not reveal 
clinical practices that endanger safety. However, it is an indicator 
because it shows staff to be concerned about the state of clinical 
care, which underpins safety.  
SHMI Taking account of patient background data (e.g., primary diagnosis, 
complicating factors), SHMI is the ratio of observed deaths at a 
hospital divided by the expected number (based on a calculation of 
the likelihood of patients dying from their admitting condition) 
(Campbell, Jacques, Fotheringham, Maheswaran, & Nicholl, 2012). 
Potentially avoidable patient deaths that may have occurred due to 
problems (e.g., medical error, neglect) in the delivery of care.  
* Please see Appendix 1 and Supplementary File 1 for statistical and descriptive information on the study variables. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Data for All Study Variables 
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Shapiro–
Wilk 
Provider spells 59 63876.41 31077.98 17434 163970 0.913* 
Patient evaluations of care 59 7.18 0.20 6.76 7.54 0.974 
Complaint frequency (per 1,000 spells) 59 3.96 1.17 1.50 7.92 0.968 
Sentiment (-5 to 5, negative to positive) 59 -0.32 0.15 -0.66 0.09 0.991 
Complaint clinical severity (0 to 3, none to 
high) 
59 0.84 0.18 0.43 1.20 
0.982 
Staff evaluations of care 59 3.67 0.21 3.06 4.16 0.990 
All safety incidents (per 1,000 bed days) 59 7.97 2.45 3.50 17.10 0.937* 
Severe safety incidents (per 1,000 bed days) 59 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.749* 
Summary hospital mortality indicator (SHMI) 59 1.00 0.09 0.76 1.18 0.961 
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Table 3. Distribution of Complaint Clinical Problems (n = 1,715), by Severity, with Examples 
Clinical problem N Low severity N Medium severity N High severity N 
Examination: neglect in 
examining and monitoring 
patients 
335 Patient with high temperature not 
monitored for a day  
39 Patient with fractures not given any X-
rays at Accident and Emergency  
180 Patient referred for cervical cancer 
examined without swabs, samples, 
or smear test 
116 
General care: neglect in 
providing clinical 
treatments 
209 Hour delay in replacing catheter 
after it had been incorrectly put in  
40 Doctor refused to administer more pain 
relief because he was too busy  
117 Heavily bleeding patient in labor 
left in corridor for 4–5 hours  
52 
Diagnosis: errors in 
making diagnoses  
192 Fractured wrist misdiagnosed as 
muscle damage; revised a week 
later 
9 Severe pneumonia and sepsis 
misdiagnosed as slight (nonurgent) 
infection 
96 Tumor in kidney misdiagnosed as 
cyst before donation of the other 
kidney 
87 
Treatment: errors in 
providing clinical 
treatments 
140 Patient needing to take urine test 
twice; urine sample misplaced  
20 Patient with contagious condition left 
in room with other (young) patients for 
7.5 hours  
69 Equipment left in patient during 
spinal surgery; not identified in 
post-surgery MRI scans 
51 
Training: mistakes by 
unqualified staff  
138 Health-care assistant unable to find 
vein for blood sample 
22 Nurse did not have experience for 
providing surgical aftercare 
75 Locum doctor operated instead of a 
gallbladder surgeon 
41 
Medication: errors in 
administering medicines  
134 Short delay in administration of 
antibiotics 
24 Patient given steroid injections instead 
of anesthetic injections 
72 Did not stop administering Epilim 
to young patient, resulting in 
pancreatitis and diabetes 
38 




leading to adverse effects  
124 Blood test causing a large 
hematoma 
10 Knee operation resulting in nerve 
damage 
63 Repair of aortic graft resulting in 
catastrophic infections 
51 
Personal care: neglecting 
patient hygiene 
90 Dirty pajamas not changed 21 Patient in poor hygienic state (e.g., no 
cleaning, shaving) 
48 Patient lying in own urine and bed 
sores for 10 days 
21 
Care plans: failing to 
develop care plans 
86 Assistance increase not considered 
in patient discharge plan 
10 Patient discharged without advice, 
home assessment, or care plan 




patient calls for help  
82 Nurse unable to come quickly when 
patient started vomiting and called 
for help  
7 Staff not responsive to alarm bells: 
patient left in shower after fall  
41 Patient left at A&E to wait while 
suffering from multiple seizures  
34 
Handling: treating patients 
roughly 
81 Breathing mask applied too tightly  27 Rough hoisting of patient who just had 
stomach surgery  
43 Bone marrow transplant patient 
required anesthetics for avoidable 
handling blisters 
11 
Teamwork: mistakes in 
coordination 
50 Confusion between nurses on 
dressing patient’s wound  
16 Patient discharged by consultant when 
another established opposite 
27 Failure to share stroke diagnosis 




54 Patient given cold meal 20 Patient not given any drinks for a full 
day 
25 Patient did not receive any food for 
four days 
9 







Figure 2. Spearman’s rank correlations, scatterplots, and density. The lower-left cells are 
pairwise Spearman’s rank correlations (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001). The upper-right 
cells are pairwise scatterplots with linear models overlaid. Boxes facilitate identifying the 
scatterplot that corresponds to statistically significant correlations: dotted (p < 0.05), dashed (p < 
0.01), and solid (p < 0.001). The diagonal displays the distribution of each variable with density 
plots. 
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Table 4. Multiple Regression for the Summary Hospital-level Mortality Indicator (SHMI) 
 Dependent variable: 
 SHMI 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Provider spells -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Staff evaluations of care  -0.120* -0.189** 
  (0.058) (0.067) 
All safety incidents  -0.001 -0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Severe safety incidents  -0.181 0.013 
  (0.353) (0.336) 
Patient evaluations of care   0.122 
   (0.072) 
Complaint frequency   0.005 
   (0.011) 
Complaint sentiment   -0.024 
   (0.079) 
Complaint clinical severity   0.208** 
   (0.067) 
Constant 1.028*** 1.496*** 0.658 
 (0.028) (0.224) (0.473) 
 
Observations 59 59 59 
R2 0.018 0.098 0.291 
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.031 0.178 
Residual Std. Error 0.093 (df = 57) 0.091 (df = 54) 0.084 (df = 50) 
F Statistic 1.019 (df = 1; 57) 1.462 (df = 4; 54) 2.566* (df = 8; 50) 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 
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Appendix 1: Sampling and Survey Analyses 
Sampling 
Healthcare complaints. The study sample was determined through a pilot study of 
healthcare complaints submitted to NHS Hospitals in 2011–2012. The pilot data contained 720 
complaints from 23 acute NHS hospital trusts, which showed a correlation between clinical 
severity and SHMI (r = 0.42, n = 23, p = 0.061). Based on these data, measuring clinical severity 
(SD = 0.71) from a trust with an average number of complaints (n = 245) with a 0.3% margin of 
error (95% confidence) would require 20 complaints per trust. A power calculation for a positive 
correlation of 0.4 (power = 0.8, p = 0.05) indicated a sample size of 37 trusts. For the 2013–2014 
sample, and to ensure we overshot the minimum threshold for the power calculation, we used a 
Freedom of Information (FOI) request to collect 50 irreversibly anonymized complaints from 
137 hospital trusts (the first 25 typed complaints immediately received after April 01, 2013 and 
the first 25 typed complaints received after October 01, 2013). For the fifty-nine hospitals that 
responded, there was variance in the final number of complaints received (M = 34.19, SD = 
12.25), for example due to some hospitals having limited resources for redaction. Consistency in 
sampling was ensured through, regardless of numbers, hospitals redacting and sampling 
healthcare complaints received immediately after the two targets dates. Eight hospitals were 
removed prior to the analysis because they did not submit the minimum of 20 complaints 
required to estimate mean clinical severity (CI 0.6, 95% confidence).  
 Secondary data. The secondary data were independently collected by several NHS 
services. In each case, we sought to obtain data nearest to 01/07/13 because this was the midway 
point between the two timepoints for sampling complaints (i.e., 01/04/13 and 01/10/13). The 59 
trusts included in the study were not significantly different from nonparticipating trusts (n = 81) 
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for the following variables: hospital provider spells (Mdnincluded = 58,568, Mdnexcluded = 51,607, W 
= 2,651, p = 0.271), the inpatient survey (Mdnincluded = 7.941, Mdnexcluded = 7.924, W = 2,549, p = 
0.502), complaint frequency (Mdnincluded = 218, Mdnexcluded = 209, W = 2,543.5, p = 0.517), the 
staff survey (Mdnincluded = 3.47, Mdnexcluded = 3.733, W = 2,477, p = 0.62), safety incidents 
(Mdnincluded = 8.1, Mdnexcluded = 7.2, W = 2,710, p = 0.177), severe safety incidents (Mdnincluded = 
0.03, Mdnexcluded = 0.03, W = 2,194.5, p = 0.407), and hospital mortality (Mdnincluded = 1.003, 
Mdnexcluded = 1.014, W = 2,421, p = 0.896). 
 
 Survey Analyses 
 Patient evaluations of care. We conducted a principal component analysis for the 25 
items underlying the survey scale specified by Dawson et al. (2018) and calculated Cronbach’s 
alpha. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure established the sampling adequacy as excellent (KMO = 
0.96, min = 0.87). A one-factor solution was viable (parallel analysis = 3, optimal coordinates = 
3, acceleration factor = 1, supported by visual inspection of the scree plot, which indicated a very 
sharp hinge at the second eigenvalue) and explained 39.73% of the variance. Cronbach’s alpha 
was 0.92 (95% CI [0.92–0.93]). ICC(1) was low and had a small effect size (0.014, 95% CI 
[0.009-0.022]), indicating isolated patient survey scores provided reduced information for 
distinguishing hospitals. ICC(2) was high and had a large effect size (0.785, 95% CI [0.709-
0.853]), indicating that when aggregated the scores measured reliable differences between 
hospitals (F(58,23218) = 6.573, p < 0.001).  
Staff evaluations of care. We conducted a principal component analysis for the four 
items underlying the survey scale specified by The National NHS Staff Survey Co-ordination 
Centre and calculated Cronbach’s alpha. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure established the 
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sampling adequacy as very good (KMO = 0.80, min = 0.79). A one-factor solution was indicated 
(parallel analysis = 1, optimal coordinates = 1, acceleration factor = 1) and explained 78.48% of 
the variance. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88 (95% CI [0.87–0.88]). ICC(1) was low and had a small 
effect size (0.053, 95% CI [0.038-0.078]), indicating that isolated staff survey scores provided 
reduced information for distinguishing hospitals. ICC(2) was high and had a large effect size 
(0.939, 95% CI [0.916-0.959]), indicating that when aggregated the scores measured reliable 
differences between hospitals (F(58, 49243) = 73.069, p < 0.001). 
	
